constitutes a rational argument, that is, with logic as a second-order discourse." 23 Additionally, Cabezón stresses the need for unity and synthesis, for "scholastics are usually dealing with large quantities of disparate textual material that is often contradictory. Part of their self-imposed task is to synthesize this material into an ordered whole." 24 1.3. In the present writer's opinion, comparative scholasticism should not, at least not primarily, aim at comparing doctrinal tenets and philosophical arguments, but rather at considering the intellectual cultures that were responsible for the formation, the development, and the overall physiognomy of law, the sciences, theology, and philosophy in the two contexts. 25 This includes the institutional environment, the teaching and scholarly practices, the many ways in which knowledge was produced, stored, enriched and made to fructify, etc. In other words, the ambition is to compare, say, structures 26 or, perhaps, "dispositifs de production," rather than intellectual contents. In doing so, the Western medieval environment is to be approached and constructed as a heuristic tool, thus resorting to what is well or at least better known in order to draw research and interpretative hypotheses concerning the social and institutional conditions that presided over the formation and the development of specific ideas in the Buddhist context. In particular, the study of Latin medieval scholarly practices is very likely to help us better assess the extent to which Buddhist philosophical and more generally "śāstric" texts reflect teaching techniques and practices.
1.4.
Among the many factors that make the Middle Ages so appealing in this connection, one could mention the fact that its philosophical traditions developed in a constant and multi-faceted dialogue with a revelation-if not revelations, if one considers its attitude toward the Aristotelian corpus from the 13 th century onward, and the fact that Jews and Muslims were involved in the process-, i.e., the fact that dialectical argumentation and experience had to constantly invent new ways of coming to terms with the Bible, the Church Fathers, and, increasingly, Aristotle. In dependence on this, the Latin Middle Ages developed as an intellectual culture in which commentarial activity played a crucial role in the interpretation and the appropriation of earlier authorities-or, as Bernardo C. Bazán says, "une culture théologique et scientifique centrée sur des textes, […] une culture en situation herméneutique." 27 The Middle Ages inherited normative divisions of the sciences (the most famous one distributing them into the trivium and the quadrivium), each field of knowledge having its own auctoritates to be relied and commented upon, and intellectually recontextualized. 28 Mention should also be made of the primacy of disputation as a method for teaching, interpreting, inquiring and, in one sense at least, debating and polemicizing.
29 23 Cabezón 1998: 6. 24 Cabezón 1994: 21. 25 For a somewhat programmatic essay on comparative scholasticism, see Eltschinger 2017 . 26 The word is used, by the way, by Marie-Dominique Chenu (1993: 66) . 27 Bazán 1985: 25, quoted 28 On the different classifications of knowledge, see Weijers 2015: 45-59 . For discussions of authority in scholasticism, see, e.g., De Rijk 1985 : 87-89, Schönberger 1991 : 103-108, Chenu 1993 ; on the authorities specific to the different disciplines, see, e.g., De Rijk 1985 : 89-96, Riché/Verger 2013 :119-145, Weijers 2015 See Bazán 1985 , and especially Weijers 2013 and 2015 . The word disputatio can refer to at least three very different discursive/dialogical situations. First, two forms of disputatio should be distinguished, the "eristic/dialectical disputation" (see Weijers 2013: 76-78) , which bears no connection with commentarial activity and "clearly seems to follow the ancient tradition of dialectical jousts as described by Aristotle and transmitted by Boethius" (Weijers 2013: 95) , and the "scholastic disputation" which, consisting in "opposing contradictory arguments" (ibid.), is "aimed at finding the truth of a deep understanding of the problem" and searching for "the right answer to real problems or to teach dialectic and philosophy" (Weijers 2013: 108) . The eristic disputation develops in the context of the logica modernorum, in the logical compendia called artes disputandi, where "the practice of the art of disputation is the central theme of the discussion" (Weijers 2013: 76) and "the disputatio is explicitly described as a discussion between an opponent (opponens) and a respondent (respondens)" (Weijers 2013: 77) . One of its four types is the "dialectical disputation," "a duel between an opponent and a respondent" (Weijers 2013: 77) . In the thirteenth century, the eristic disputation gives rise to the ars obligatoria, obligationes constituting "the logic of a certain form of disputation in which each participant tried to induce the other to contradict himself […] . Serving as a means to teach and check the correctness of dialectical rules, it can be considered both as an exercise and as a preliminary stage for real (i.e., doctrinal) disputation […]" (Weijers 2013: 77) . It is important to note that the scholastic disputation "is not a dialectical duel between two opponents, but the discussion of a question-using dialectical tools of course-between a master and his students or between several masters and bachelors (i.e., students having obtained the first degree)" (Weijers 2013: 121-122) . According to Weijers (2013: 122) , the scholastic disputation differs from the eristic in at least four ways: "First, it is generally the disputation of a question arising, at least in the beginning, from the reading of texts, especially in the faculties of theology and arts; often it concerns difficulties arising from the text, apparent contradictions or conflicting interpretations. In the faculty of law, it concerns concrete juridical cases, as it did in the twelfth-century law schools […] . Second, it aims at determining (or teaching) the truth, at finding the right answer to the question; its use of dialectical argumentation, especially syllogisms, is geared wholly to this end. Third, the basic structure of the scholastic disputation is quite different from the eristic disputation: after the formulation of the question, arguments are given both for the affirmative and for the negative answer, after which the master gives his solution (usually one of the two positions discussed, but he may propose an alternative by means of distinction) and refutes the arguments counter to this opinion. Fourth, at least three participants figure from an early stage: the master, who proposes the questions, presides over the discussion and gives his solution, the respondent, who gives a preliminary answer, and the opponent, who attacks the respondent's arguments. In more important disputations, several respondents and opponents appear […] . These two forms of disputatio should be distinguished from "public debates, […] a kind of dialogue on philosophical subjects conducted before a public" (Weijers 2013: 96 ; on public debates, see also Weijers 2013: 82-84) . According to Weijers (2013: 82) , " [t] hese public debates may have been inspired by the eristic disputation, which also sometimes took place before an audience. However, they were controversies about questions of philosophical interest and not dialectical jousts, and did not follow Moreover, most of the pre-14 th -century medieval intellectuals were clerics, be it simply because they were granted legal privileges as university scholars. And although, in contradistinction to most of what we know from the Buddhist context, all of them did not belong to the regular clergy, 30 many important philosophers and theologians from the 13 th and 14 th centuries actually belonged to the mendicant orders of the Dominicans or the Franciscans and thus were as much committed to promoting their own monastic order as they were to defending their own personal views.
From lectio to disputatio
2.1. The teaching methods resorted to by medieval masters have received a lot of critical attention thanks to the work of scholars such as Martin Grabmann, Palémon Glorieux, Lambertus Marie De Rijk, Bernardo C. Bazán and, closer to us, Olga Weijers, to whose decisive contributions the following presentation is heavily indebted. In particular, these and other specialists have shown how the origin of the disputation, admittedly one of the practices most characteristic of the medieval academic landscape, could be traced to the lectio ("which means not only the reading but also the explanation of and comments on a text" 31 ), from which, in the form of the quaestio disputata, it was gradually detached and gained autonomy in the 12 th or 13 th century depending on the contexts. 32 As remarked almost fifty years ago by P. Glorieux, "[l] a dispute est née de la leçon, par l'intermédiaire de la question," 33 a hypothesis that since then has been widely confirmed: "Such questions raised by the master during the lectures and discussed immediately in the classroom are called quaestiones; the term quaestio disputata (disputed question) is generally reserved for the written form of questions that have been discussed, to be distinguished from the discussion itself, which is called disputatio (disputation).
[…] When the questions are completely separated from the explanations of the texts, not only in time but also in subject, and thus become an independent exercise, we see the birth of the disputatio in the sense of the scholastic disputation."
34 According to Anthony Kenny, "[p] erhaps the disputatio simply grew out of the other and older vehicle of professional instruction: the lectio, or lecture. In the course of expounding a text a commentator, from time to time, is bound to encounter difficult passages which set special problems and need extended discussion. When we are dealing with a sacred or authoritative text, the difficult passages will have given rise to conflicting interpretations by different commentators, and the expositor's duty will be to set out and resolve the disagreements of previous authorities. Thus the quaestio arises naturally in the course of the lectio, and the disputation and the lecture are the institutionalized counterparts of these two facets of a method of study oriented to the interpretation of texts and the preservation of tradition." 35 This interpretation of the historical development of the disputatio out of the quaestio via the quaestio disputata is further confirmed by O. Weijers, according to whom "there seems to be no doubt that quaestiones developed out of commenting on basic texts during the lectures. The divergence or obscurity of the authoritative texts suggested that comparison and critical analysis, along with dialectic, was used. This provided the occasion for a discussion on a theological issue, in which dialectic played a role-a discussion about a quaestio. The question here was thus initially a problem of interpretation. […] With the help of dialectic, from Abelard onwards, the masters developed a complete method of teaching and research based on the systematic and well organised discussion of such quaestiones. […] At the same time the collections of Sentences (the most famous was Peter the Lombard's) established a form of systematic theology in which we also find questions arising from the discrepancies between authorities and being discussed with a certain amount of dialectical argumentation."
36 Thus "the divergence between different the systematic format of the quaestio […]. They were discussions in which two opponents expressed different opinions, defending them with arguments based on authorities or on dialectical reasoning, but they did not obey certain rules and thus differ from both types of disputation we saw above. Let us call them 'debates' to mark the difference (although they too are often called disputatio in the written reports)." Importantly, "[w]e may deduce that in these debates one of the two participants was declared victorious, a detail that reminds us of the victories reported by Peter Abelard in his autobiography: he not only defeated his master William of Champeaux in a discussion about universals, but later sent his own students to debate with the same master and his pupils" (Weijers 2013: 83) . 30 Philosophers such as Arcaṭa (8 th century) and Śaṅkaranandana (10 th century?) could have been exceptions to this in that, though Buddhists from a religio-philosophical, doctrinal point of view, they were and remained brahmins. 31 Weijers 2013: 84. See also Weijers 2015 : 79-80, Glorieux 1968 : 108-122, and Chenu 1993 See Weijers 2013, esp. pp. 84-88, and Bazán 1985: 31-34 . Weijers points to the period between 1150 and 1200 and the circles of Simon of Tournai and his successors (Weijers 2013: 87) , the School of Laon for the "resolution of theological problems during the exposition of the Bible" (Weijers 2013: 84 ), Abelard's famous Sic et non, which "sets out to contrast authorities, principally the Church Fathers" (Weijers 2015: 95-96) , and other theologians such as Gilbert of Poitiers, Stephen Langton and Robert of Melun. 33 Glorieux 1968: 123 . According to Chenu (1993: 67) , " [l] e 'style' scolastique peut être ramené à ses éléments simples, […] à trois procédés, dont la progression figure d'ailleurs à la fois leur genèse historique et leur progrès technique: on est passé de la lectio à la quaestio, puis de la quaestio à la disputatio." See also De Rijk 1985 : 99-101 and Solère 2002 : 1302 . 34 Weijers 2013: 87. 35 Kenny and Pinborg 1982: 25. 36 Weijers 2013 : 85, summarizing Bazán 1985 authorities or between different parts of the same authoritative text" 37 likely was one of the driving forces in the development of the quaestio as an exegetical and doctrinal device destined to "to teach the meaning of the text but also to try to understand and clarify the problems implied by it." 38 2.2. The presence of a contradiction and the discussion of antithetical propositions are definitory features of the question. These were foreshadowed in the writings of Aristotle 39 and especially Boethius who, in his In Topica Ciceronis Commentaria, defined the quaestio as a dubitabilis propositio, "a proposition which one can doubt." 40 And in his De differentiis topicis, the same Boethius characterizes a question as in dubitationem ambiguitatemque adducta propositio, "a proposition leading to doubt and uncertainty."
41 Thus according to Boethius, a question always entails doubt and contradiction: "A question comprises at the same time an affirmation and a negation; for by the very fact that it is subject to doubt it seems to include a contradiction" (ibid., 1049 B). This contradictoriness is reflected in the most frequent expression of the question, the utrum… an… ("whether… or…") formula. In the first half of the twelfth century, Gilbert of Poitiers (1076-1154) elaborated on Boethius's definitions. While agreeing that a contradiction is always involved in a question, he emphasized that "doubt is only present when valid arguments seem to support both parts of the question, the pro and the contra."
42 Hence the characteristic form of the question from the first part of the 13 th century onward: "First the question-which could be answered by yes or no-was formulated, then arguments (based on authoritative texts or on dialectical reasoning) for the two possible answers were given. Next the master provided a 'determination' or 'solution' (i.e., the definitive answer to the question along with the justification), and finally there was a refutation, also given by the master, of the arguments given for the opposite position."
43 This situation helps define both disputation as an art or a method and dialectic as the technique of argumentation proper, since "disputation is the art of discussing correctly-in other words to use serious argumentation to debate doubtful or contradictory propositions and prove which position is valid and which not. […] [T]his art is the art of dialectic, since Ancient times considered the foundation of all rational inquiry." 44 In his De differentiis topicis, Boethius defined an argument as "a reasoning (ratio) that makes a dubious matter trustworthy" (argumentum autem ratio est quae rei dubiae faciat fidem). 45 In the context of the discussion of a question, ratio as rational argument or dialectical reasoning (particularly syllogisms) is appealed to in addition to other sources for valid argumentation, such as auctoritas, (the quotation of an) authority or authoritative text, and experientia, experience, "that is to say perception of the real world by the sense," 46 or "experimental verification, meaning essentially the observation of reality, the way in which we experience reality." 47 2.3. What was to become the disputed question, i.e., what was called dubia, quaestiones or dubitationes, originally was allotted a specific (and rather limited) part toward the end of the commentary, at least in the commentaries in the form of lectiones 48 that were very common in the Paris Arts faculty between 1230 and 1260: "Commentaries in the form of lectiones […] resembled the traditional literal explanations. They were divided into units of reading or lessons (lectiones), and each lectio had several fixed elements. The divisions of the commented passage (into 37 Weijers 2013: 85-86 . 38 Weijers 2013: 86. Among the other factors, mention can be made of questions concerning "difficult points, obscure expressions or intriguing features" (ibid.). See also Chenu 1993: 71, and Panofsky's interesting remarks in Panofsky 1957: 65ff. 39 As remarked by Weijers (2013: 74) , opposing pro and contra arguments in order to arrive at a solution comes very close to "the aporia method of Aristotle," sometimes referred to as "diaporematic," where "diaporein means to find a way amidst thoroughly explored difficulties," whereas "the solution is called euporia, which means 'solve the aporia in a satisfactory way'" (Weijers 2013: 35, referring, e.g., to Metaphysics III,1, Topics I,2, and Ethics VII,1, where "one presents a problem [aporia] , introduces the conflicting opinions of philosophers, solves the difficulties and formulates the new opinion" [Weijers 2013: 36] ). Note, by the way, that "[a]poria was translated by Boethius as dubitationes, or doubts, in his version of the Aristotelian treatise On interpretation" (literally, an aporia is "a difficulty obstructing the way" [ibid.], i.e., "problems arising from the fact that the savants of the past disagree about them or that valid arguments can be found for both sides" [ibid.]). Schönberger (1991: 52) 43 Weijers 2013: 124. As Chenu points out, objicere/objectio do not always have the meaning we are familiar with: "objicere, c'est inducere rationes, donner des raisons pour l'une ou l'autre partie, et non pas opposer un fait ou un raisonnement à une thèse au préalable établie" (Chenu 1993: 79) . In the same way, the sed contra arguments are not aimed at refuting the objections; rather, they consist in rationes quae sunt ad oppositum: "La seconde série d'arguments n'est pas contre la première série, elle est pour la seconde partie de l'alternative et ne s'oppose qu'indirectement aux arguments donnés pour la première. Ce qui s'oppose directement aux arguments combattus du point de vue de la thèse établie dans la détermination, ce sont les réponses qui suivent le corps de l'article, les responsiones ad objecta, c'est-à-dire réponses aux arguments […] , qu'ils soient de la première ou de la seconde série, dès lors qu'il s'écartent de la thèse" (Blanche 1925 : 177-179, quoted in Chenu 1993 . 44 See Weijers 1996: 42-44. several sections and subsections) are set out at the beginning of each lectio. The exposition or paraphrase (expositio or sententia in speciali) then follows; this is sometimes preceded by the sententia (in generali; alternatively called the intentio), in other words the general meaning, so that the reader is given the broad sense of the passage before the commentary moves to literal analysis. The final section, sometimes following an ordo or ordinatio (describing the place of the passage within the text and the order of its parts) contained the dubia or quaestiones, questions or uncertainties arising from the text."
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The Theory of Indian Buddhist Commentary 3.1. As we have seen above, P. Masson-Oursel and J.I. Cabezón have insisted on commentarial activity as a defining feature of scholasticism regarded as a transcultural phenomenon, and cursory comparisons between Indian and medieval commentaries are not rare, as is testified by some pages of Madeleine Biardeau, likely the greatest among 20 th -century French exponents of Indian philosophy. 50 The centrality, the abundance and the diversity of commentarial activity have long been recognized as an essential component of intellectual life in ancient India understood as a (set of) traditionalist culture(s) averse to anything perceived as "new." As was pointed out by many specialists, however, commentaries often were, in India as elsewhere, a vehicle for (more or less discrete) innovation, and the adjective "new" was by no means universally perceived as deprecatory. 51 Be that as it may, in spite of several seminal studies, the Indian commentary has not received the systematic attention it deserves.
52 As even a superficial look at Indian commentaries suggests, raising objections and responding to them belong to the most congenial tasks and, as a point of fact, actual activities of Indian commentators. Here again, studies, and especially statistically based analyses of specific corpora are missing, and the extent to which this objection-andanswer structure has been normatively theorized as a mandatory feature of commentaries remains unclear. There is, however, at least one ancient Indian textual tradition that consciously theorized it as a necessary part of a commentary. Indeed, from at least the *Vivaraṇasaṅgrahaṇī (VivSg, Tib. rNam par bśad pa bsdu ba) of the Yogācārabhūmi (YoBh, 4 th century CE ?), 53 a tradition of Indian Buddhist scholastics has construed codyaparihāra, "responding to(/refuting) objections," 54 as a necessary component of Buddhist canonical exegesis, a component that, as its Latin counterparts, was gradually allotted the final part of a commentarial sequence. Interestingly, this aspect of a commentary was also regarded by Indian Buddhist intellectuals as triggered by contradictions (virodha)-either in the form of internal inconsistencies or in the form of contradictions with reason(ing). And as we shall see, this doctrinal and apologetic complex can also be shown to be at the heart of later Buddhist philosophy. In other words, a defining feature of scriptural commentary can be regarded, if not as having given rise directly to philosophy in the Buddhist environment, at least to have become an essential element of the Buddhist philosophers' way of accounting for their own philosophical and apologetic enterprise.
Strictly speaking, the VivSg is dedicated, not so much to commentary as (a) literary genre(s), as to the way in which a Buddhist preacher (dharmabhāṇaka) should explain the canonical scriptures in a catechetic, apologetic 49 Weijers 2015: 81; Weijers 1996: 42. 50 In her influential presentation of classical Indian philosophy in the Encyclopédie de la Pléiade, M. Biardeau quotes É. Gilson (1969: 83) and Thomas Aquinas (Commentary on Ethics, I, 2, as quoted in Chenu 1959: 135; Biardeau 1969: 87-88) . She writes (1969: 87): "Le travail philosophique [en Inde ancienne, VE], de plus, semble s'être fait moins dans une méditation solitaire et désintéressée que dans la relation de maître à disciple, où le maître expose sa doctrine en y incluant les débats avec ses adversaires. C'est pourquoi les commentaires philosophiques prennent une forme essentiellement scolastique qui tient à la fois de la leçon et de la dispute médiévales, tandis que les textes indépendants rappelleraient plutôt les disputes 'quodlibétiques.'" Biardeau alludes several times to scholasticism: "Disons donc simplement que la pensée brahmanique n'entre pas telle quelle dans nos catégories. En deçà de la distinction entre philosophie et théologie, elle se présente néanmoins comme une scolastique de plus en plus subtilement élaborée à partir de textes religieux intangibles " (1969: 92) . "Les [les systèmes philosophiques ,VE] considérera-t-on alors comme de la 'théologie', en tenant compte de leur relation essentielle à une révélation? Ce serait encore rester dans une problématique occidentale où, même au Moyen âge, la distinction entre une pensée 'naturelle' et rationnelle pure et une pensée théologique s'appuyant sur le donné révélé est claire" (1969: 89). "Parce qu'elle avait rencontré la philosophie grecque (peut-être la seule philosophie spéculative ancienne qui se soit présentée comme uniquement rationnelle, sans présupposé religieux), la pensée médiévale chrétienne savait parfaitement qu'il y avait deux ordres de connaissance: la connaissance de foi, fondée sur un donné révélé partiellement perméable au travail de l'intelligence humaine, mais que celle-ci n'eût jamais pu découvrir, et la connaissance naturelle, où la raison s'exerce souverainement sur l'expérience qu'elle a du monde et construit sa vérité avec les critères de validité interne qu'elle se donne, n'ayant d'autre limite que son pouvoir actuel de connaissance " (1969: 90) . Other direct allusions to scholasticism in indological scholarship include, e.g., Gerhard Oberhammer, Ernst Prets and Joachim Prandstetter's three-volume Terminologie der frühen philosophischen Scholastik in Indien (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , and Gary Tubb and Emery R. Boose's Scholastic Sanskrit, A Manual for Students (2007) . 51 See, e.g., Biardeau 1969 : 83-96, Ratié 2013 , and Seyfort Ruegg forthc. 52 See Chenet 1998 , Hulin 2000 , Preisendanz 2008 , and Pollock 2015b Although the work is commonly known as *Vivaraṇasaṅgrahaṇī, its original Sanskrit title more likely was *Vyākhyā(na)saṅgrahaṇī (see Delhey 2013: 539, and below, n. 56 56 Explaining all these items would bring only very little in the present context. Let it be noted that "responding to objections" is one of the five aspects of "explication," which the VivSg presents as follows: "Having first investigated the corpus of buddhavacana ["Word of the Buddha"VE], one should seek out all ten forms of meaning-or whichever is suitable-in the scriptural texts (gsuṅ rab, *pravacana). Having done so oneself, one should teach these to others. Accordingly, a dharma preacher should engage in the practice [of teaching] by explicating in five ways those sūtras […] . First, he should expound the teachings. After that, he should expound the prompt. After that, he should expound the meaning. After that, he should expound responses to objections. After that, he should expound connections." 57 As we can see, the Buddhist preacher first "privately" analyses the twelvefold canon 58 (dvādaśāṅgapravacana) according to, or by identifying, ten different kinds of meaning.
59 It is only once he has secured this understanding for himself that he turns to exegesis proper (1) by locating the explicated text in the twelve canonical "genres" or registers, (2) by identifying the "prompt," i.e., discerning the motivation (turn one away from desire; instruct him; gladden him) behind the explicated text, (3) by ascertaining its summary and literal meanings (the latter by "indicating synonyms, […] the corpus, […] etymological derivation, and analyzing into aspects"), (4) by formulating and answering possible objections, and (5) and see above, n. 53. As noted by Nance himself (2012: 254, n. 1), he has "shifted the order in which these topics are listed in the opening verse to track the order in which they are treated in detail in the ensuing text." 57 
YoBh, VivSg D 'i 54a1-3: de ni re źig saṅs rgyas kyi bka''i lus yin te / de'i phyir gsuṅ rab la don bcu po de dag thams cad dam gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba yoṅs su btsal bar bya'o // de ltar bdag ñid kyi don du yoṅs su btsal nas gźan dag la bstan par bya'o // de ltar […] mdo sde la chos smra bas rnam pa lṅas rnam par bśad pas 'jug par bya ste / daṅ por chos brjod par bya'o // de'i 'og tu kun nas sloṅ ba brjod par bya'o // de'i 'og tu don brjod par bya'o // de'i 'og tu rgol ba'i lan brjod par bya'o // de'i 'og tu mtshams sbyar brjod par bya'o //. Translation Nance 2012: 181.
See also YoBh, VivSg D 'i 48a3 and Nance 2012: 169. 58 The twelve "members" (aṅga) are: (1) sūtras, (2) melodic verses (geya), (3) prophecies/predictions (vyākaraṇa), (4) verses (gāthā), (5) inspired utterances (udāna), (6) circumstantial narratives (nidāna), (7) parables/stories (avadāna), (8) ancient narratives (itivṛttaka), (9) accounts of former lives (jātaka), (10) extensive scriptures (vaipulya), (11) fabulous accounts (adbhutadharma), (12) instructions (upadeśa). The VinSg explains "instructions" as "matrices" (mātṛkā) and abhidharma, i.e., Buddhist dogmatics. See Nance 2012: 181-183, and more generally Lamotte 1976: 159-161 and Nattier 2004. 59 On the ten types of meaning, see Nance 2012: 174-180. 60 According to YoBh, VivSg D 'i 55b5: raṅ gis gleṅs pa'am gźan gyis brgal ba. 61 The Tib. expression śin tu lkog tu gyur pa generally renders Skt. atyantaparokṣa, "radically imperceptible," which, in later Buddhist epistemology, refers to those states of affairs that are unempirical/transempirical, i.e., neither directly perceptible (pratyakṣa) nor inferable (anumeya). This interpretation may, however, be somewhat anachronical, for the example adduced by the VivSg, the (inner) self (*adhyātma, *ādhyātmika?) does not, properly speaking, point to a radically imperceptible object, but rather to what is technically known as an avyākṛtavastu or "unanswered question/point" (as in questions such as "Is the soul different from the body or not?," "Does a Buddha survive after death or not?"). The VivSg's explanation of the response to be given to this type of objection leaves no doubt about this (YoBh, VivSg D 'i 56a2-6, see Nance 2012: 186-187) . 62 statements," a type of rhetorical defect generally regarded as a hallmark of untrustworthiness. 63 According to the VivSg, this type of objection is answered by exhibiting the intention underlying these apparently contradictory loci. 64 As for contradiction with reason (yuktivirodha), it points to a given statement's failure to meet the requirements of reason(ing) (yukti), an important concept that, as we shall see, was given at least two different interpretations within Buddhist scholastic circles. The type of reason(ing) involved in our passage plays on two possible meanings of the Sanskrit word yukti = yoga (and the English word "reason"): reason as causa fiendi and reason as causa cognoscendi, the latter (the logical one) being understood as relying on, or reflecting, the former (the ontological one). This type of reason(ing) is regarded as fourfold: reason(ing) (based) on the realization of an effect (kāryakaraṇayukti), reason(ing) (based) on mutual dependence between entities (apekṣāyukti), reason(ing) that proves by means of arguments (upapattisādhanayukti), and reason(ing) (based) on the true nature of things or the way things are (dharmatāyukti). 65 Unfortunately, the VivSg has only very little to say about the kind of answer that should be given in such a case: "[Contradiction with reason:] One should offer a response by indicating a kālāpadeśa, by indicating the four modes of reasoning, and by indicating the connection between the cause and the result, saying 'This is the result of such-and-such a cause. '" 66 This brief description entails three elements. While responding, the explicator first can point to the fact that the claim underlying the objection is simply unbuddhistic by showing that it is a kālāpadeśa, literally a "black/detrimental teaching." Teachings of that sort are purported by some alleged (or self-appointed) authority to have been made by the Buddha himself and can be shown, on closer analysis, neither to conform to the sermons (sūtra) and the discipline (vinaya) preached by the Buddha nor to reflect the way things actually are (dharmatā).
YoBh, VivSg D 'i 55b5-7: de yaṅ mdor bsdu na rnam pa lṅas rgol te / don ma rtogs pa ni ma rtogs pas tshig 'bru 'di'i don ci yin źes rgol lo // tshig 'gal bas ni 'di lta ste bcom ldan 'das kyis sṅar ni gźan du gsuṅs la 'dir ni gźan du gsuṅs so źes bya ba lta bus so // rigs pa daṅ 'gal bas ni gaṅ la rigs pa bźi daṅ 'gal ba kun du snaṅ bas so // cha du ma kun du snaṅ bas ni 'di lta ste / bcom ldan 'das kyis de daṅ der rnam graṅs du mas don de ñid yoṅs su bstan pa lta bus so // śin tu lkog tu gyur pas ni 'di lta ste / naṅ gi bdag gaṅ yin pa de ni rtag pa daṅ brtan
67 Second, the explicator can answer by showing that the statement under scrutiny actually conforms with the standards of rationality as defined by the above-mentioned four types of reason(ing). Finally, he can prove the rationality of the commented text by resorting to causality, i.e., by demonstrating that things actually behave as they are said to do. As one can see, the three strategies overlap to a great extent: "the way things are" (dharmatā) is common to methods 1 and 2, and methods 2 and 3 both resort to causality. In other words, demonstrating that the scriptural statement commented upon does not contradict reason(ing) amounts to showing that it is consonant with the rest of Buddhist scriptures and that it conforms to reality itself interpreted, in a characteristically Buddhist way, as an entangled web of causal processes.
3.2.1.
There is little doubt that Vasubandhu (active around 400 CE?), himself a Yogācāra author, knew the VivSg as he composed his influential Vyākhyāyukti (VY), a manual of scriptural exegesis with a strong leaning toward apologetic on behalf of the Mahāyāna (the "Great Vehicle" toward salvation and enlightenment). 68 Vasubandhu's VY is not only far more exhaustive than the VivSg in its treatment of codyaparihāra; it is also working with a fairly different-one is tempted to say a new-concept of rationality. The treatise starts with the following words: "How should one discuss the sūtras? [One should do so] via five aspects (ākāra). One should state the purpose (prayojana) of the sūtra; the summary meaning (piṇḍārtha); the meaning of the phrases (padārtha); connections (anusandhi); and the two: objections and responses (codyaparihāra). The two-objections and responses-are collapsed into one [aspect] (1) Vasubandhu re-organizes the VivSg list by replacing "teaching" and "prompt" by "purpose," by dividing "meaning" into "summary meaning" and "meaning of the phrases," and inverting the order of items 4 and 5, "objections and responses" and "connections"; (2) These two logia of the Blessed One give every appearance of contradicting each other: whereas the Markaṭasūtra emphasizes the mind's momentariness, the second locus, by claiming the mind's perfectibility and gradual improvement, involves its enduring nature. To this, Vasubandhu suggests the following response: "When [the Blessed One] says that the mind is momentary and that it goes upwards, he speaks intending (*abhipretya?) its continuum(/series) (*tatsantāna?); therefore, there is no [internal] contradiction, as [there is a contradiction between] the shadow and the rise of the (sun)light." (Bodhi 2000: 595) . In the second passage, Vasubandhu quotes from a passage very close to SN V.370, ll. 5-7: yañca khvassa cittaṃ dīgharattaṃ saddhāparibhāvitam sīlasutacāga-paññāparibhāvitaṃ tam uddhagāmi hoti visesagāmi /. "But his mind, which has been fortified over a long time by faith, virtue, learning, generosity, and wisdom-that goes upwards, goes to distinction." Translation Bodhi 2000: 1808. Closer parallels could not be identified. 71 VY 191, [20] [21] [22] , "parihāra(6): pūrvāparaviruddha(1)"): sems ni skad cig ma źes bya ba yin la / goṅ du 'gro ba yaṅ yin no źes gaṅ gsuṅs pa yaṅ de'i rgyun la dgoṅs nas gsuṅs pa'i phyir 'gal ba med do // grib ma daṅ me 'bar ba 'gro ba bźin no //. The simile must be based on a text similar to MN II.235: seyyathāpi bhikkhave yaṃ chāyā jahati taṃ ātapo pharati / yaṃ ātapo jahati taṃ chāyā pharati / evam eva kho bhikkhave pavivekāya pītiyā nirodhā uppajjati domanassaṃ domanasassa nirodhā uppajjati pavivekā pīti /. "Just as the sunlight pervades the area that the shadow leaves, and the shadow pervades the area that the sunlight leaves, so too, with the cessation of the rapture of seclusion, grief arises, and with the cessation of grief, the rapture of seclusion arises." Translation Ñāṇamoli /Bodhi 2001: 844. 72 VY 170,17-27 (P si 101b3-5, "pūrvāparaviruddha(3)"): de bźin du kha cig las mi rnams kyis ni 'di na bsod nams daṅ // sdig pa gaṅ yin gñis ka byed pa ste // de'i bdag gir bya ba yin śiṅ des // de yaṅ khyer te 'gro bar byed pa yin źes gsuṅs pa daṅ / kha cig las las kyaṅ yod rnam par smin pa yaṅ yod la byed pa po ni mi dmigs so źes gsuṅs pa […] //. The first locus (pādas 1-3 of the stanza) is somehow reminiscent of Uv 9.8ab: yat karoti naraḥ karma kalyāṇam atha pāpakam / (tasya tasyaiva dāyādo na hi karma praṇaśyati //). As for the second, which belongs to the Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra, it is frequently quoted in the framework of the controversy over the pudgala ("person") . See, e.g., AKBh 129,9-11 (quoted Lee 2001 : 170, n. 1215 : asti karmāsti vipākaḥ kārakas tu nopalabhyate /. A slightly longer passage is quoted in MSABh 158,20-22 (for a discussion and further references, see Eltschinger 2010b: 322-323) , BCAP 340, [22] [23] [24] [23] [24] n. 3, and below, n. 73 3.2.3.3. Our second example presents us with a case of alleged contradiction with authoritative scripture (āgama-virodha), the "mainstream" Buddhists' contention that the Great Vehicle is a forgery (i.e., not the word of the Buddha) because it contradicts the basic teachings of the Buddha. This case is of a particular importance inasmuch as it triggers one of the quantitatively and qualitatively most prominent aspects of the VY, i.e., its apology on behalf of the Great Vehicle, 81 and inasmuch as it reflects what likely was an important concern of early 1 stmillenium Indian Buddhist communities. As we can see, the objections (at least theoretically) raised in the framework of commentaries were not limited to sophisticated dogmatic or philosophical issues, but could pertain equally well to important challenges of a socio-historical nature. 3.3. These four cases are far from exhausting the examples of internal and "external" contradictions adduced by Vasubandhu in the VY, but it should be clear by now that pointing to contradictions of either kind, basing objections upon them and answering these form an essential part of Indian Buddhist commentaries as theorized by Vasubandhu and others. Far from being limited to minor philological issues or superficial misunderstandings, these objections pertain to the most important aspects of Buddhist doctrine. It remains to be seen whether those who wrote scriptural commentaries with Vasubandhu's recommendations in mind complied with this modelwhich seems to have been at least partly the case in Kamalaśīla's exegetical practice.
84
Before concluding, let it be briefly mentioned that these two types of contradictions played a significant role in the development and the self-understanding of Buddhist epistemology, a tradition in which, as its name suggests, the means of valid cognition played a key role. Two important aspects of this tradition's treatment of the pramāṇas are that it limits their number to perception and inference (thus excluding scripture from reliable souces of knowledge), and that it sharply distinguishes the empirical (dṛṣṭa) from the transempirical realm (adṛṣṭa, [atyanta]parokṣa, atīndriya, etc.) , the first being accessible to ordinary human cognition (viz., the two pramāṇas) while the latter is the object of scriptural authority (āgama [prāmāṇya] ). Buddhist epistemology is of an essentially apologetic character. In other words, its principal task is to critically assess (and, needless to say, to reject) the truth claims of other systems and to defend Buddhism against its opponents. There is at least one important passage in Dharmakīrti's works demonstrating that yuktivirodha and pūrvāparavirodha played a decisive role in this apologetic endeavor, but severed from their originally exegetical context. Whereas, in the exegetical handbooks considered above, yuktivirodha and pūrvāparavirodha were two types of contradiction, each is assigned a definite epistemological function in Dharmakīrti's system. Assessing the reliability of a given treatise or scripture-what these and earlier authors call a parīkṣā or "critical examination"-proceeds in two ways: first, its empirical statements should be checked against perception and inference; second, since those of its statements that pertain to the transempirical realm can be neither verified nor falsified, its internal consistency while dealing with supersensible things at least should be checked, and this is tantamount to searching for pūrvāparavirodha. Here is this all-important passage: "The [treatise]'s reliability consists in the fact that neither perception nor the two kinds of inferences [i.e., inference based on the force of real things and scripturally based 
Conclusion
Both in the Latin Middle Ages and in Indian Buddhist scholasticism, a significant part of doctrinal elaboration and philosophical thinking was embedded in or closely connected to scriptural commentary and emancipated itself from it in the form of the quaestio disputata and the disputatio on the one hand, of a type of parīkṣā on the other. In both contexts, contradictions between conflicting authorities, internal contradictions and other kinds of inconsistencies motivated objections that were critically addressed at the end of a commentarial sequence. In both contexts, the main expressions of "mature" philosophical activity bear strong formal and structural reminiscences of this origin. This is certainly not to say that philosophy arose from exegesis, of course, for even in the Buddhist context, at least a form of philosophy preexisted this type of commentary. But forms first developed in the framework of commentarial activity shaped and strengthened the type of philosophical expression that was to dominate the two intellectual cultures at their acme (12 th -14 th c. and 6 th -12 th , respectively).
